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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
J. M. WEBB and 
SPENCER WEBB, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
'MARGARET 'VEBB and 
:MARGARET WEBB, 
Administratrix of the Estate 
of Wilmer Webb, Deceased, 
Defendants and Appellant~. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
No. 7208 
PRELIMINARY STATENIENT 
On October 26, 1946, the plaintiffs commenced this 
action against the defendants to quiet title to a number 
of parcels of real estate and water rights, and a number 
of head of livestock and farm machinery and equipment, 
all situated in Millard County, Utah. The real estate 
consists of a home in Deseret, and a few tracts of farm-
ing land. After demurrers to the complaint were over-
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ruled defendants secured more time to answer and finally 
on June lOth, 1947, filed their separate answers and 
counterclaim. 
The answer and counterclaim of Margaret Webb, as 
administratrix of the Estate of Wilmer Webb, by way 
of counterclaim alleges that she married Wilmer Webb 
on July 21st, 1945, and that he died intestate on the 4th 
day of July, 1946, leaving her as his sole surviving heir; 
that at the time of his marriage he was about 42 years of 
age and was the owner of the property described in plain-
tiff's complaint, plus a few additional items of personal 
property; that for many years prior to March 18, 1946, 
Wilmer and the plaintiffs were partners in the farming 
and livestock business and owned certain partnership 
property; that on or about the 15th day of March, 1946, 
by mutual consent of the plaintiffs and Wilmer the part-
nership was dissolved, at which time the plaintiffs prom-
ised to account for and pay Wilmer the proportionate 
share of all moneys previously collected by them and to 
render to the defendant on demand an accounting; that 
the plaintiffs refused to account to her; that she has 
been in possession of the home property and claims it as 
a widow's homestead; that she and her husband on March 
15th, 1946, executed to the plaintiffs a deed covering the 
lands and water rights described in plaintiffs' complaint; 
that about March 18, 1946, Wilmer executed to plaintiffs 
a bill of eale to the personal property described in the 
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complaint; that said transfers and conveyances were 
made without any other consideration than as a mortgage 
to secure sums to be advanced for the benefit of Wilmer 
and his wife. rrhe administratrix prays that the bill of 
sale and deed be determined to be a mortgage, and that 
the court require the plaintiffs to make an accounting to 
her. (Tr. 19-23). 
The amended answer of :Margaret Webb as an indi-
vidual alleges much the same factual situation as the 
answer of Margaret vV ebb as administratrix, and in addi-
tion alleges tlm.t Wilmer began ailing in September, 1945, 
and his ailment continued to grow worse until he was 
hospitalized in March, 1946; but that she did not know 
that his ailment would be fatal; that about March 15, 
1946, an attorney for Wilmer and the plaintiffs fraudu-
lently represented to her that it would be easier for plain-
tiffs to finance the medical care and hospital expenses if 
she and her husband would turn over Wilmer's property 
to plaintiffs; that the property was worth the sum of 
$30,000.00; that she accepted a check for $500.00 as a 
consideration for signing the deed but that the check has 
never been cashed; that she did not intend to waive her 
statutory one-third interest in her husband's property; 
that the deed was made without consideration; that the 
deed was procured from her with the express i~tention 
of cheating and defrauding ~er and is void. She prays 
that the conveyances be set aside and title to the property 
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be quieted in the defendants. (Tr. 34-44). 
The brief of appellants, pages 5 to 20, sets forth the 
defendants' counterclaim in detail, and the above refer-
ences to the allegations of the answer are therefore very 
brief. 
The trial court determined the issues in favor of the 
plaintiffs and made rather extensive findings of fact and 
concluded that the plaintiffs are the owners of the realty 
and personalty and entitled to the immediate possession 
thereof; that the defendants are entitled to take nothing 
by reason of the counterclaims, excepting as otherwise 
provided; that the defendants are not entitled to an ac-
counting upon the evidence as produced in the trial, but 
that the right to an accounting should be rejected and 
denied without prejudice to the right of the defendant to 
apply for an account hereafter, if she be so advised. A 
decree was entered in favor of plaintiffs and against the 
defendants accordingly. (Tr. 51-62). Also see appellants' 
brief, pages 23 to 34. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendants Were Not Entitled to Trial by Jury 
Appellants' assignment of error No. 1 urges that the 
court erred in not granting a jury trial. There are a num-
ber of reason~. why the refusal of the trial court to call 
out a jury is not error. 
. A review of the pleading8, and a review of the facts 
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and circumstances leading up to the request of 'the appel-
lants' for a jury trial will be helpful in determining the 
question here involved. 
The action was commenced by a complaint setting 
up a cause of action to quiet title to real and personal 
property, (Tr. 4-8). We concede that under the decisions 
of this Court a suit to quiet title has been held to be an 
action at law. (Babcock vs. Dangerfield, et al., 94 Pac. 
(2nd) 862, 98 Utah 10; Bolognese vs . .Anderson, 90 Pac. 
(2nd) 275, 97 Utah 136; N orback vs. Board of Directors, 
37 Pac. (2nd) 339, 84 Utah 506). 
But the question still remains : Are the issues or the 
major issues under the pleadings equitable. If equitable, 
then respondents contend the appellants were not entitled, 
as a matter of right, to a trial by jury. 
We call attention to the concurring opinion of Mr. 
tTustice Wolfe in the case of Petty vs. Clark, 102 Utah 186, 
129 Pac. (2nd) 568, at page 571, wherein it is said: 
''In the cas~ of Nor back vs. Board of Directors 
of Church Extension Soc., 84 Utah 506,37 Pac. (2nd) 
339, 345, this court laid down the rule: That 'If the 
issues are legal or the major issue legal, either party 
is entitled upon proper demand to a jury trial; but, 
if the issues are equitable or the major issues to be 
resolved by an application of equity, the legal issues 
being merely subsidiary, the action sho:uld be re-
garded !ls equitable and the rules of equity apply. 
Coulson vs. LaPlant, Mo. Sup., 196 S. W. 1144; 
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Southern Pac. Land Co. vs. Dickersont 188 Cal. 113,-
204 Pac. 576; Park vs. Wilkinson, 21 Utah 279, 60 
Pac. 945." 
The answer of l\Iargaret Webb, as administratrix of 
the estate of Wilmer Webb, deceased, by way of affirma-
tive defense and counterclaim, alleges that on the 15th 
day of 1\{arch, 1946, Wilmer Webb and the defendant made 
and executed to the plaintiffs a certain deed covering the 
lands described in the complaint, but that it was given as 
a mortgage and without any other consideration, (Tr. 
21-22). Also that to further secure moneys to be ad-
vanced by the plaintiffs, Wilmer executed to plaintiffs a 
bill of sale of the property described in plaintiff's com-
plaint (Tr. 22). In the prayer defendant asks that the 
deed and bill of sale be determined t<> be a mortgage or 
mortgages, that the court find the amount advanced or 
paid out by plaintiffs and require plaintiffs to convey all 
of the property to the defendant under payment of such 
indebtedness (Tr. 25). 
The amended answer and counterclaim of Margaret 
"\\-rebb, as the widow of Wilmer Webb, deceased, pleads 
that on March 15th, 1946, an attorney for the plaintiffs 
and Wilmer Webb called on her and made certain repre-
sentations; that for a consideration of $500.00 she signed 
the deed; that the deed was obtained from her and from 
Wilmer, thereby vesting the apparent legal title to said 
lands in the _plaintiffs; that the deed was obtained with 
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the intention of cheating and defrauding her out of her 
widow's one-third right, title and interest in the property, 
and without any consideration; that Wilmer Webb exe-
cuted the bill of sale with the intention of cheating and 
defrauding defendant and that the transfer was without 
consideration andToid (Tr. 35-40); that she executed the 
deed believing it was a mortgag·e, relying upon the rep-
resentations made to her; that the bill of sale and deed 
were given to defraud her out of her statutory one-third 
right, title and interest in her husband's estate, and that 
she will suffer great loss and damage for which she has 
no plain or speedy adequate remedy at law, (Tr. 41); 
that portions of the real estate described in the deed is 
the home of the defendant and is claimed as a widow's 
homestead, (Tr. 42). The prayer-asks that the deed and 
bill of sale be cancelled and set aside, and if said instru-
ments are not so vacated they be held to be mortgages 
only (Tr. 42). 
The answer of the administratrix (paragraphs VII, 
VIII and IX of the first affirmative defense and counter-
claim, Tr. 22-23), attempts to plead the right to an ac-
counting, and prays that the court require the plaintiffs to 
make an account of all receipts and disbursements from 
or on account of claimed partnership property, (Tr. 25). 
The major issues, therefore, were to be resolved by 
an application of equity, and the legal issues, if any, were 
merely subsidiary. In other words, the basi~· of the plain-
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tiffs' claims and title to the property was the deed and 
bill of sale passing title to them, and the execution of 
both were a~itted and acknowledged by the defendants' 
respective answers. The defendants themselves treated 
. the issues as equitable and so announced to the court 
when the case was called for trial, as evidenced by the 
following: 
THE CouRT : * * * There may be a question also 
as to whether this is a case in which the defendant has a 
right to a jury trial, being equitable issues involved, it 
should be decided by the court in any event. 
:MR. UDELL R. JENSEN: "\Ve had in mind that the jury 
would be advisor-y to the court. 1\fay the record show the 
money was tendered to the clerk before the setting, and 
upon suggestion of the court that the money was returned 
to the defendant's counsel. 
THE CouRT: The record may show that the jury fee 
was tendered to the clerk before re-setting of the case, 
but not before the previous s.etting. (Tr. 89-90). 
The plaintiffs' sole proof in their case in chief was 
the introduction in evidence of the deed executed by :Mar-
garet Webb and Wilmer \Vebb, and tlie bill of sale exe-
cuted by Wilmer Webb, by which title to the realty and 
water rig·hts, and personal property, passed to the plain-
tiffs. Since t.he execution of these docun1,ents were 
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pleaded by the defendants in their respectiYe answers, 
there would be nothing·, so far as the plaintiffs' cause of 
action is concerned, to submit to a jury. \Vhether the de-
fendant Marg·aret \Yebb was entitled to claim a widow's 
statutory one-third interest in the realty, and whether she 
was entitled to claim a homestead, are questions of law 
which would not, in any event, be submitted to a jury for 
answer. The other issues, - those raised by the defend-
ants' affirmatiYe defenses, appear to be equitable. 
Respondents do not rest their contention that appel-
lants were not entitled to a jury trial solely on the basis 
that the issues raised by appellants are equitable. Re-
spondents further- contend that the appellants were not 
entitled to a jury trial because demand was not timely 
made, and a jury trial was for that reason waived. In 
all of the cases inYolving the question of a- right to trial 
by jury, this Honorable Court has qualified that right by 
holding that it exists only ''on proper application'' and 
"if timely made." Certainly the defendants did not make 
a timely demand for a jury. On the contrary, the record 
shows the demand for a jury was made long after the case 
had been originally set for trial and at a time when the 
granting of a jury trial would have been inopportune 
and would ha-ve necessitated a delay of perhaps several 
months. 
The complaint was filed October 26, 1946. Demur-_ 
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rers were filed N oveJUber 22nd, 1946. On January 20th, 
1947, and again on April 7th, 1947, the demurrers were 
overruled and defendants given fifteen days to answer, 
(Tr. 359). On April 7th, 1947, defendants' counsel was 
present in court, and the case was set for trial for May 
13th, 1947. No jury was demanded, (Tr. 355-6). It is 
true that answers were not filed on April 7th, but under 
the order of the court the answers should have been, and 
the court expected answers would be served and filed on 
or before April 22nd. On :May lOth, 1947, upon applica-
tion of defendants, they were given until June lOth, 1947, 
to plead to the complaint, (Tr. 11). On :May 12th, 1947, 
at the request of the defendants, the trial was continued 
to June 26th, 1947, and on the same day, when the case 
was again re-set for trial, the defendants did not request 
or demand a jury (Tr. 356). Again it will be observed 
that when this case wa,s re-set for trial for June 26th, 1947, 
J 
the answers should have been and the court expected 
answers would be filed by June lOth. On June lOth, 1947, 
separate answers of Margaret Webb, as administratrix, 
and Margaret Webb, as an individual, were filed. 
On June 16th, 1947, at request of the defendants the 
trial was again continued over from June 26th, and again 
re-set for trial for July 15th, 1947, without a request or 
demand for a jury, (Tr. 356). On July 14th, 1947, and one 
day before the trial date, for the first time, the defendants 
rfq~~sted a jurr a~d paid the jury fee, ('rr .. 356). Pr~" 
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vious to July 15th, 1947, the defendants requested a fur· 
ther continuance, and on July 15th, 1947, the following 
proceedings were had in Court : 
This case ha·ving· been heretofore set for trial 
this date, and counsel for defendants having re-
quested a continuance thereof and having also re-
quested a jury trial, and counsel for plaintiff having 
stated that he would resist a further continuance of 
the. case unless trial could be had at an early date, 
it was ordered that the case be set for non-jury trial 
Wednesday, September 3rd, 1947, at ten o'clock 
A. ~L The clerk was directed to notify counsel for 
defendants of the setting and was also directed to 
_return to defendants' counsel the jury fee tendered. 
(Tr. 357). 
It must be assumed from the foregoing proceedings 
that an early trial could not be had before a jury, and 
the court did not feel that the trial should be unduly de-
layed because of a request for a jury made after the case 
had been set for trial several times and continued at the 
request of the defendants, and particularly when the re-
quest for a jury was made one day before the trial date. 
This Honorable Court should not assume the, action of 
the trial court was arbitrary and without good reason, 
but on the contrary should assume that with good reason 
the trial court could not call out a jury during the month 
of September. It is common knowledge that the popula-
tion of Millard and adjoining counties consists largely of 
farmers who are busy irrigating and later harvesting 
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crops during the late summer and early fall of the year, 
and it is very difficult to call out and· secure a jury at 
that time of the year. It is also common knowledge that 
in counties such as Millard, where the territory is large 
and prospective jurymen are required to travel many 
miles to the county seat, the cost to the county of calling 
out a jury for a special case is prohibitive. Without doubt 
the court felt an early trial could not be had if the case 
. should be tried before a jury, and without doubt the court 
felt the plaintiffs were entitled to an early trial after the 
several continuances at the request of the defendants. 
One of the rules of the District Court of the Fifth 
.Judicial District provides as follows: 
When a jury is demanded in civil cases, triable 
by jury, a failure to deposit the jury fee required 
by law· at the time of, or prior to the setting of the 
case for trial, shall be deemed a waiver of the right 
to a jury trial. (Tr. 357). 
Under the above circumstances, it has been held by 
this Court, in common with practically all other jurisdic-
tions, that the demand for a jury was not ·made timely, 
and hence was waived, and that the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in refusing to grant a jury trial. 
Sec. 104-23-6, U.C.A. 1943, provides: Either 
party to an action of the kind enumerated in the pre-
ceding section who desires a jury trial of the same, 
or of any issue thereof, must demand it, either by 
\Yritten notice to the clerk p1·ior to the time of setting 
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such action for trial, or within such reasonable time 
thereafter as the court may order, or orally in open 
court at the t'ime of S'ltch setting * * * * . 
The statute in question does not provide, as do the 
statutes of some states, that a jury must be demanded 
''after issue joined'' or that a case may not be set down 
for trial until after all of the pleadings have been filed. 
In the case at bar the record shows that the defendants' 
counsel was in court at the time the case was first set 
down for trial. The record shows also that the answers 
of the defendants should have been filed long prior to the 
trial date, and the ans·wers were delayed at the express 
request of the defendants. 
It was held in the case of Utah State Building and 
·Loan Assn. vs. Perkins, et al., 53 Utah 474, 173 Pac. 950, 
"it will be seen that the demand for a jury at the time the 
case was called for trial came too late. Unless there is 
some record showing a demand at the time specified in 
the statute, a refusal, and an exception taken to the ruling 
of the court, the matter is not before this court for review, 
and the right or privilege of trial by jury will be held to 
have been waived." Citing Nichols vs. Cherry, 22 Utah 
1, 60 Pac. 1103; and Davis vs. D. & R. G. R. Co., 45 Utah 1, 
142 Pac. 705, 709. 
To the same effect are the cases of: 
Board of Education of 8. L. City vs. West, et 
al, 55 Utah 357; 186 Pac. 114; 
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Emerson-B'rantingham Imp. Co. V$. Giles, et al., 
59 Utah 54, 202 Pac. 543; 
It is a matter of discretion with court to al-
low or refuse a demand for a jury, when not made 
within statutory time or extended time provided by 
court rule, and it is not an abuse of discretion tore-
fuse a late demand for jury trial, if no excuse is 
shown for failure to make timely demand. Thomp. 
son et ux., vs. Anderson, et al., 107 Utah 331, 153 
Pac. (2nd) 665. 
A party who takes a position which either leads 
a court into error in procedure, or by conduct ap-
proves error committed by court, cannot later take 
advantage of such error. Ludlow, et al., vs. Colo-
rado Animal By-Products Co., 104 Utah 221, 137 
Pac. (2nd) 347. 
When the case at bar was called for trial and when 
the court announced there might be some question as to 
whether the vV ebb case was one in which the defendants 
had a right to a jury trial because the issues involved were 
equitable and should be decided by the court, counsel for 
defendants did not urge that this was a law case in which 
they had an unqualified right to a jury, but conced~d that 
they had in mind that the jury would be advisory to the 
court, (Tr. 89-90). 
In the case of Osage Oil & Refining Co. vs. McDowell, 
et al., 220 Pac. 609 (Okl), the court set a trial date for 
Dec. 9, 1922, the parties in open court having waived a 
jury. On Dec. 9th the cause was continued, without ob-
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jection, to the 15th day of December, 1922, when one of 
the parties demanded a jury trial, which demand was 
denied. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma held the de-
mand came too late. In the case at bar counsel for de-
fendants was in court when the case was originally set 
down for trial, and under the statute waived the right to 
trial by jury by failing to make his demand at that time. 
We contend that having once waived the rig·ht to trial by 
jury, a litigant is not entitled to a jury trial as a matter 
of right because of a continuance. 
'Vhere action was called for trial and parties 
waived a jury but trial was continued to a later 
date, denial of request for a jury trial at subsequent 
date was not an abuse of discretion. Ezzell vs. Ends-
ley, 169 Pac. (2nd) 309, (Okl). 
Refusal of demand for jury trial filed July 19th, 
1935, in action commenced in April, 1934, in which 
defendant entered appearance May 31st, 1934, after 
case had been noted for trial in 1\tlay, 1935, is not an 
abuse of discretion, since demand was not season-
ably filed. Niemeier vs. Rosenbaum, 63 Pac. (2nd) 
424, Wash. 
The record shows that throughout the proceedings 
the appellants adopted a course of delays in pleading and 
further delays in getting the case to trial. 
If the appellants are entitled to a trial by jury under 
the circumstances herein enumerated it would be tanta-
mount to holding that, having once waived the right to 
a jury trial by failing to demand it when the case is orig-
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inally set, diligent attorneys and litigants who are ready 
for trial at the time set cannot 1·egain that right, but the 
dilatory can regain sueh a right by requesting and pro-
(•.uring one or more continuances. In fact, it would be 
tauta1nount to holding that litigants, lJ~· securing one or 
more delays or continuances after a ca:-;e is once set for 
trial, could seen re a jury trial by artifice ai1d indirection 
when such a right could not be otherwiHe secured. -
:B1 inding:-; of :b,act Arc Supported by Evidence 
Appellants urge that the findings of fact are not sup-
ported by, but are contrary to, the preponderance of the 
evidence. Respondents, upon the contrary, contend that 
the findings are not only supported by the evidence, but 
that the evidence preponderates in f'aYor of the findings 
and the trial court could not have properly found other-
wise. 
At the outset the appellants find themselves in the 
unenviable position of asserting that the case at bar is an 
action at law and consequently they were entitled to a 
jury trial, and then urging that the trial eourt should be 
reversed because the findings arc contrar:· to a prepoH· 
deranee of the cYidence and "will iu l'l}Uify be vacated 
and set aside." If the case be an action at Jaw and the 
nwjor .iHsues are legal and not equitable,. then the rule 
to bt> applied must be : 
A fiu.ding lJ)'" the trial court in an action at law 
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supported by son1e substautial PYidenee cannot be 
disturbed on appeal, tho the Supreme Court might 
find diffel'ently. Jlu8scr l'8. JlcCoruick & Co., 57 
rtah 6~, H1~ Pac. 105~. 
t'et• abo: 
Hait:;Oil l"8. Grecllleaf, 62 Utah 168, ~18 Pac. 969. 
Kelley n·:. Jloab State Bank, ()J Utah 290, 230 
Pac. 366. · · · 
Baker C8. lrycoff, 93 Utah HJ9, 79 Pae. (~nd) 
· 77, at page 83. 
It will not be sufficient to say that the findings are 
contrary to a preponderance of the evidence, since the 
rule is that if there is any substantial evidence to support 
the findings 1 the findings must be upheld. 
Howe,·er, if this case be considered at:l one in equity, 
then the rule to be applied is : 
The Supreme Court on an appeal in an equit-
able action will consider questions of fact as well as 
questions of law, but \\'ill not disturb findings of fact 
where ~he evidence is conflicting; unless it is made 
to appear that the findings are clearly against the 
L'Yidence * * * . Gee, et al., rs. Baum, et al., 58 Utah 
445, 199 Pac. 680. 
SeL' also: 
Turubull cs. Jl eek, 58 Ctah 23, 196 Pae. 1008. 
Si1zglelo·n rs. Kelly, 61 Utah 277, 212 Pac. 63. 
In the Singleton case above cited this court stated 
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"unless the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings as made by the lower court its decision must 
stand.'' 
The testimony, excluding the matters concerning an 
accounting, is rather brief. The only evidence in the rec-
ord upon which many of the pertinent 'findings are predi-
cated, is that of :Margaret Webb, and Dudley Crafts, an 
attorney at Delta. A review of their evidence will cer-
tainly convince this Court that there is substantial evi-
dence to support such findings. In fact, it will convince 
tlris Court that there is a preponderance of the evidence 
to support such findings. 
The findings of fact are comprehensive and determine 
all of the issues raised by the pleadings. It appears from 
the evidence and from the findings made therefrom that 
Wilmer Webb was a man of about 42 years of age wheri 
he and :Margaret vV ebb were married; that Margaret had 
been married before and divorced and had three children 
by a former marriage. There were no children born as 
the issue of the Webb marriage. The parties were mar-
ried on July 21st, 1945. "\Vilmer began ailing during the 
month of September, 1945, and his ailment continued to 
grow steadily worse until February, 1946; in March, 1946, 
he was hospitalized at S-alt Lake. City and remained in 
· the hospital until his death on July 4th, 1946. The parties 
were rna rried less than a year when Wilmer died. Shortly 
after the marriage there w~:re ~ number of differences 
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between the parties and there was some discus~ion of a 
separation and divorce. About March 15th, 1946, and 
while Wilmer was in the hospital he discussed with Dudley 
Crafts, an attorney at law, the marital difficulties then 
existing between himself and wife, and requested Mr. 
Crafts to visit Margaret and see if she was willing to 
effect a reconciliation and remain at the home perma-
nently and take care of Wilmer, and if she was unwilling 
to do so, then to make arrangements with Wilmer's broth-
ers, (respondents herein), to take care of him during the 
balance of his lifetime and pay the expenses incident to 
his illness and provide for him the balance of his lif~time. 
The consideration for payment of the expenses and care 
of Wilmer would be the transfer to respondents of Wil-
mer's property. At that time Wilmer knew he would be 
unable to work for a considerable length of time and that 
he might be an invalid for his remaining lifetime. Mar-
garet was also aware of this situation. 
Mr. Crafts visited Margaret and attempted to pro-
cure her consent to remain with Wilmer as his wife, and 
look after Wilmer when he returned home. She informed 
Mr. Crafts that a reconciliation would not be possible and 
when the school term ended in May of 1946, she was going 
to leave Wilmer, but wanted to occupy the home and use 
his car until she left. 
Mr. Crafts then suggested that under such circum-
stances the plaintiffs were willing to undertake Wilmer's 
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support and pay all medical and hospital bills and take 
care of him during his lifetime, but that it would be neces-
sary under such arrangement to have Margaret's signa-
ture to a deed covering the realty. ~:iargaret stated she 
did not want any part of the property, but upon the sug-
gestion of Mr. Crafts said she would accept $500.00 if 
the plaintiffs and not Wilmer were paying the money. 
Mr. Crafts then prepared the deed and ~iargaret, out of 
Mr. Crafts' presence, took it before a notary public and 
executed and acknowledged it. The deed was then taken 
to Salt Lake ·where Wilmer executed it, and .at the same 
time executed a bill of sale to his personal property and 
executed to the plaintiffs a transfer of the title to the car. 
The deed and bill of sale and certificate of title to the car 
were then delivered by Wilmer to the plaintiffs. Prac-
tically all of· the above facts are shown by the testimony 
of Mr. Crafts, (Tr. 274 to 298). 
The real estate with water rights were worth $8966.00 
and the personal property transferred was worth $4671.00, 
including war savings bonds worth $575.00. (Finding No. 
15, Tr. 55) . 
.A bout three months after the execution of the deed 
and bill of salE• Wilmer died. Immediately after signing 
the deed Mar~aret consulted an attorney and thereafter 
did not casl1 the check, but she took no action to rescind 
or annul the deed or repudiate the transaction until after 
Wilmer's death. (Finding No. 10, Tr. 54). 
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Aftpr Margaret. refused to 1·emain with " 7ilmcr, or 
to stay at the home beyond the school season, the plain~ 
tiffs, .Jack and Spencer \Yehb, brothers and former part· 
ners of \Yilmer, ag;reed with Attorney Crafts, who was 
representing \Yilmer, to take r.are of \Vilmer the balance 
of his lifetime, and to assume and pay all of \Yilmer 'K 
expenses. At that time \Vilmer was in the hospital and 
many expenses had been incurred. }[ore could be antiei-
pated in the immediate future and perhaps for months 
and e,~en ~;ears to rome. 
It is quite obvious from the record that marital dif .. 
ficulties commenced shortly after the marriage, and when 
it became apparent to :Jiargaret that her husband was a 
Yery sick man likely to be a permanent invalid, she was 
going to "run out on him." It is equally obvious that 
when :Margaret had reason to believe all of vVilmer 's prop-
erty would be used up in paying tremendous hospital and 
doctor bills, and that \Vilmer 's ability to support her and 
her children was gone, she would not remain with him or 
be tied down to or assume the care of an invalid. It 
seemed obvious that all the assets would be dissipated 
because in a period of approximately three months the 
expenses amounted to many hundreds of dollars. There 
was no percentage in ::\[argaret 's remaining, particularly 
when two brothers were willing to assume Wilmer's care 
during his lifetime, even though the assets did not cover 
the expenses. She was more than willing to ''get out 
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from under," but when Wilmer died in about three 
months, and the expenses incurred were but $1750.00, she 
found she had made a bad bargain and concluded to re. 
pudiate the entire transaction and claim Wilmer's prop-
erty. This Court cannot help but conclude from the tes· 
timony that Wilmer's wife was callous and coldblo()ded, 
without the slightest regard for her moral obligations as 
a wife. 
The correspondence between Margaret and Wilmer, 
while Wilmer was in the hospital, shows the pattern, and 
corroborates the testimony of ~Ir. Crafts to the effect that 
:Margaret refu!?-ed to effect a reconciliation and intended 
to leave in May as soon as the school season was over. 
Defendants' exhibit "Y" (referred to as exhibit 3 in de-
fendants' brief) is a letter written March 5th to Wilmer 
and contains this statement: "It isn't fair to you to have 
us here using your house and cream checks when you 
could use them, so I will start looking around and see 
what arrangements I can make. Then you won't have so 
much to worry' about.'' On March 8th Margaret again 
sent a letter to Wilmer, (Ex. 3), in which she said: "It 
wouldn't look very good for me to walk out on you while 
you are ill, so hurry and get well.'' On March lOth, after 
receiving 1\iargaret's letters Wilmer begged her to stay 
on and not leave him (Ex. E). He said to Margaret: 
''Honey, you said you would do anything to help me while 
I was up here.. You can· by at least staying until I can 
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come home and can help me more by staying much longer 
for I don't love anybody else. • ~ • You said you were 
going to look around. Honey, please don't until I get 
home. • • * '' On ~I arch 14th, in answer to Wilmer '8 
letter, :Margaret stated, (Ex. R) : ''Don't worry about 
anything down here we are getting along alright. I guess 
things can go along like this for a while longer, at least 
until you are on your feet again and can take care of your 
self." 
~irs. Webb's answers on cross-examination (Tr. 142 
to 161 and 169 to 184), attempting to explain what she 
meant by the above statements in her letters, were so 
evasive and unsatisfactory as to convince the trial court 
that Mr. Crafts' testimony should be given greater ere~ 
deuce than the testimony of the defendant. In fact even 
a casual reading of her· testimony must lead one to the 
conclusion that her testimony is not entitled to credence 
where it conflicts with the testimony of Attorney Crafts. 
Mr. Crafts, an attorney who ha~ practiced law at 
Delta, Utah, since 1924, testified that he was requested by 
Wilmer Webb, as a friend, to intervie~ Margaret Webb. 
This request was made while Wilmer was in the hospital, 
and between March lOth and 14th. Wilmer advised Mr. 
Crafts that his (Wilmer's) wife was going to leave him 
and asked if an attempt should be made to effect a recon-
ciliation, and if that could not be done what arrangements 
should b.e made to take care of the expenses and to take 
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care of him for the rest of his life. ::Mr. Crafts suggested 
if the wife would assume no responsibility that Wilmer's 
brothers be asked if they would take care of him for the 
halance of his lifetime and assume the expenses of hos-
pital, doctor hills, etc., and that he, Wilmer, make a prop-
erty settlement with them by conveying his property to 
them. (Tr. 276-277). 
1Ir. Crafts then went to see "Jlargaret 'Vebb 011 :March 
14th at Deseret. A rather lengthy conversation ensued 
in which 1\'Ir. Crafts told :Margaret that Wilmer was very 
ill and wanted to effect a reconciliation and have her con-
tinue 011 as his wife. :Margaret stated she never could 
effect a reconciliation. She v\ras then told that Wilmer 
would be a cripple and wouldn't be able to get around at 
all for a year to a year and a half and was asked if under 
those circumstances would she just stay in the house and 
care for Wilmer during his illness. She said she was not 
willing to do that - she definitely had made up her mind 
to pull out as soon as the present school term ended and 
under no circumstanees would she stay longer. (Tr. 279-
.280). She was then asked if she would he willing to make 
a property f'ettlement and file snit for diYoree so Wilmer 
" ... ouh1 know ho·w much he had to pay her, and how much 
property he would haYc left to make arrangements for his 
care during the remainder of his life. She stated all she 
they were married only a short time; that the children 
.wanted was to take what she had brought with her; that I 
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were not \Yilmer 'R; and she did not feel she was entitled 
to any of 'Vilmer 's property, ( Tr. 280). She was then 
told that if she was not willing to stay and take care of 
'Vilmer, he "·anted her to take what part of the property 
she thought she was entitled to and that he would then 
conYey the rest of it to his brothers with the definite under-
standing that it would be their ohlig·ation to pay all his 
bills and snpport him and giYe him personal care during 
his remaining yPnrs. She was asked if she would join in 
such a COllYe~·ance and she again stated she did not want 
any of 'Vilmer 's. property but wanted only to remain in 
the home until the school year ended and to have the use 
of the car during that period, (Tr. 281). 1\Ir. Crafts told 
2\Iargaret if ~he executed the deed she would he signing 
away absolutely all rights of every kind in all property 
and that she should not do so without some consideration, 
and without some counsel. They discussed the sum of 
$500.00 to he paid to her as the monetary cons~deration . 
. (Tr. 281-282). 
Thereafter ~[r. Crafts prepared the deed and took 
it to :l\fargaret at Deseret, with a check for $500.00, and 
requested her to sign the deed and have her signature 
notarized. ~f argeret then walked across the street where 
a notary was aYailable, signed the deed and brought the 
acknowledged deed back to :Mr. Crafts and accepted the 
ch<'ek for $500.00, (Tr. 282). Previously Mr. Crafts ad-· 
visr<l1\Tnrg:aret that if Wilmer eame home Jack would take 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
26 
him right into his home and give him the best possible 
care as long as he lived. Margaret stated she was sure if 
Wilmer had a chance to think it over he would realize this 
arrangement was for the best, (Tr. 284-285). Mr. Crafts 
was not representing either of the plaintiffs. It should 
be borne in mind that at all times Mr. Crafts was repre-
senting Wilmer, and Wilmer alone. 
Some short time after the above conversation and 
signing of the deed by Margaret, Mr. Crafts again visited 
Wilmer at the hospital and related to him the results of 
the conversation with Margaret. Wilmer then asked about 
the arrangements which Mr. Crafts had with Jack and 
Spencer· and was told that he (Crafts) had the promise 
not only of the brothers, but their wives, that they would 
care for him, (Tr. 286). 
Mr. Crafts then testified that both Jack Webb and 
Spencer Webb were advised on March 14th, 1946, that 
Wilmer's condition was very serious; that some arrange-
ments would have to be made for his care; that he might 
live for a number of months or years but would never 
again be able to do work and would likely be a cripple 
the rest of his life; that some financial arrangements 
would have to be made for Wilmer's care; that it was 
probably Wilmer's desire that he convey his property to 
them with the definite promise on their part that they pay 
all of his doctor bills, hospital expenses and other obliga-
tions and would support and care for him as long as he 
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lived, regardless of how long that might be. They were 
asked point blank if they would be willing to assume the 
responsibility of caring for Wilmer as long as he lived 
and pay his bills, regardless of how much it might cost 
them. Mr. Crafts insisted that they discuss the matter 
with their wives, as the wives might have the personal 
responsibility of nursing Wilmer. The plaintiffs and 
Jack's wife were willing to take Wilmer into their home 
and nurse and care for him as long as he lived, (Tr. 280-
281). On the following day, March 15th, after the deed 
was signed by Margaret, 1Ir. Crafts told the plaintiffs 
that arrangements had been made and they were definitely 
to assume the responsibility of paying Wilmer's hospital 
and doctor bills and other obligations and they agreed to 
go up to Salt I..~ake the next day to pay the bills thus far 
incurred, and when Wilmer came out of the hospital ar-
rangements would be made to take him right into Jack's 
home, (Tr. 293). 
Spencer Vvebb testified that Mr. Crafts asked him 
and .J aek if they would be willing to take on the responsi-
bility of caring for Wilmer and paying his bills, etc., if 
in return Wilmer's property was conveyed to them. Both 
brothers agreed to the arrangement, (Tr. 299 to 303). J. 
~f. (Jack) Webb testified to substantially the same thing 
and to his obligation to assume joint responsibility with 
Spencer, (Tr. 324 to 328). 
It appears very clearly from the record that there is 
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ample support in the e\·idence upon which to predicate 
the findings. The defendant, l\Iargarct \Y ebb, both as 
the 'vidow of Wilmer \\T ebh and as the administratrix of 
his e~tate, had the bun}en of establishing her affirmatiYe 
defenses and counterclaim, an<l she failed in such burden 
of proof. Even under the equity rule, where the eYidence 
is conflicting, this court will not disturb the findings of 
fact because it is not made to appear that such findings 
are clearly against the evidence. We are confident the 
defendant has not and cannot indicate one single finding 
or portion thereof that is not supported by the evi<lence, 
or that is contrary to the preponderance of the evidence. 
Evidence as to Y alue of Property 
Defendants complain that the Court erred in reject-
ing their offer to prove the Yalue of the home at Deseret 
by showing the amount a purchaser was willing to pay 
for it. ~rhe Court found the value of the home to be 
$4000.00, as testified to by i\lr. Crafts, who qualified as 
an expert on real estate YalHPf-1, (Tr. 273-27-t). rrhe \rit-
ness :Mary A. Anderson te~tifiecl that fron1 her inquiry 
concerning the value of the property she had a judgment 
of its reasonable market value and that it was "·orth 
$6000.00, (Tr. 269-270). r.rherefore the matter of whether 
she was ·willing to bu:· the hmnc aull what she would pny 
for it was immaterial, and the court was correct in so 
holding. 
I 
I I 
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HowL·vcr, iu any eYeut, if we assumed that the t·ou rt 
did err in refusing the offer, ~uch error would be imnm-
terial. The court could still find the ,·alue to be $4000.00 
ba~ed on the tl'~timony of attorney ( 1rafh;, a far better 
authority on value~ than ~Irs. L\ndersou, the prospective 
purchaser. Abo, if the couYeyauee of the property by 
\Vilmer and his wife to the plaintiffs is upheld, the Inatter 
of value i~ of no importance. 
Conversations Claimed by Appellants to Have Beer~ 
Hearsay and Confidential Should Nevertheless Have 
Been Admitted by the Trial Court 
\\' e are at a loss to know upon what theory the appel-
lants contend that the testimony of Dudley Crafts in the 
particulars set forth in their assignments of errors X os. 
3 to 7, are hearsay or constitute confidential COlnmunica-
tions and therefore inadmissible. Certainly in appellants' 
argument concenring such assignnwnts of error (their 
brief pager; 85 to 57) nothing is said to indicate appel-· 
Jants' theor:-·. In fact nothing appears excepting the bald 
statement that such conversations are hearsay and priv-
ileged. 
vVhen the plaintiffs introduced the bill of sale and the 
deed, they made out a prima facie case and rested. rrhere 
can bono question but what a conveyance is presumed to 
ha,·e bC'Pll supported by a suffieient consideration; that 
the law Jn·esumc~ at lea~d a nominal consideration; that 
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t:4e burden of proof is upon the party seeking to avoid a 
deed; and one attacking the validity of a deed has the 
burden of defeating the presumption of consideration. 
These principles are so well established and recognized 
it is deemed unnecessary to quote authority therefor. (See 
Babcock vs. Dangerfield, 98 Utah 10, 94 Pac. (2nd) 862). 
When plaintiffs rested, Margaret Webb took the wit.. 
ness stand in support of her affirmative defenses and 
counterclaim and testified at great length to the conversa-
tion between herself and ~Ir. Crafts. She testified to the 
things which she said Mr. Crafts told her. Certainly hav-
ing opened up the matter of this conversation, Mr. Crafts 
was then properly permitted to state what he told Mar-
garet Webb, even if in such testimony he was repeating 
what Wilmer Webb told him. Counsel for 1Iargaret Webb 
asked her concerning a conversation with Wilmer Webb 
in the hospital on the morning of March 18, 1946, after the 
deed had been executed, at which time plaintiffs were not 
present, (Tr. 126-127). This conversation had to do with 
the transaction in question and particularly concerning 
the home, and whether Wilmer knew the home was in-
chided in the deed. When Mrs. Webb testified to conver-
sations with her husband held outside the presence of the 
plaintiffs she could not with ·good grace object to Mr. 
Craft's testimony concerning conversations with \Vilmer 
about the same matter and tending to dispute :Margaret's 
testimony. The defendants voluntarily opened up the sub-
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ject and respondents contend they were then entitled to 
meet the situation with testimony of the same kind and 
character. 
:Margaret testified that her husband never received 
anything· for signing the deed or bill of sale. This testi-
mony was permitted to stand over the objection of the 
plaintiffs, (Tr. 140). She also testified that Mr. Crafts 
told her if Wilmer was ever able to work and run his farm, 
all he would have to do would be to repay the money that 
was paid out for him and take back his property, (Tr. 142). 
This testimony on the part of :Margaret Webb was intro-· 
duced clearly in support of her allegation that there was 
no consideration for the execution and delivery of the 
deed and bill of sale. The conversations between Mr. 
Crafts and Wilmer as to the promises made by tl;le plain-
tiffs to take care of him, and the conversations between 
Crafts and the plaintiffs concerning their promises and 
agreements, were in refutation of the claim of defendants 
that there was no consideration. Such evidence cannot be 
excluded under the hearsay rule, even if held in the ab-
sence of the defendants. 
If plaintiffs cannot testify to their agreements to 
take care of Wilmer and pay Wilmer's bills, -as the consid-
eration for taking title to the property, merely because 
such promises were not made in the presence of Margaret, 
then how can they refute :Margaret's testimony that ''she 
did not know of her husband receiving anything for sign-
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ing the deed and bill of sale.'' They could testify to such 
promises made to Attorney Crafts, who was the represent-
ative of Wilmer, the same as they could testify to having 
made such promises and agreements directly with Wilmer 
if the conversations had been with and made directly to 
Wilmer. Would they be precluded from testifying to 
their business deal and arrangement with Wilmer merely 
because Margaret was not there, when she was claiming 
there was no consideration . and that very fact was the 
point in issue. 
If Mr. A contests Mr. B 's title to property because it 
is claimed'' B'' paid no consideration for such property, 
is '' B '.1 unable to testify to the amount paid, to whom and 
when paid, and the circumstances of payment merely be-
cause A was not there to hear the deal made between B 
and B 's vendor or see the passing of the consideration. 
Snch a contention seems absurd. 
It is claimed by appellants that Mr. Crafts, being 
"\Yilmer 's attorney, could not testify to conversations with 
his client after the death of the client without the consent 
of the administratrix. Such a contention is not supported 
either by any cases or texts cited. The true rule is set 
forth in Jones on Evidence (2nd Ed), Vol. 5, Section 2164, 
as follows: 
' ' In addition to the exception to the general 
rule excluding confidential communications between 
attorney and client where questions concerning the 
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circumstances surrounding the execution of a will 
are in issue, it seems that the general rule yields to 
necessity in somewhat analogous instances in some 
jurisdictions, at least. Thus where, after the death 
of the client, litig·ation arises between parties all of 
whom claim under the client and the question to be 
determined is not the existence of a right of action 
against the estate but the intention of decedent as 
to creation of various rights which remain ambigu-
ous, the attorney may testify. The reasoning is the 
same as in cases where the facts surrounding the 
execution of a will become material. In the broad 
sense of the term, all such matters are part of the 
'res gestae,' that is to say, the issue being directly 
as to whether the client did or did not have such 
knowledge or do. such acts or give rise to or control 
the rights of the parties, determination of the fact 
directly determines the rights of the parties. It 
would be a harsh rule to permit one claimant, who 
claims by aJlegation under the client, to seal the lips 
of an attorney who is the sole repository of the evi-
dence as to the basic merits of the claim as against 
another equally claiming under the client. The 
client, tho deceased at the time, must be presumed 
to have consented that under such a state of cir-
cumstances the attorney should speak, even tho 
communications which would h!J.ve been confidential 
and privileged during the lifetime of the client and 
under other circumstances, are thereby divulged. 
Thus an attorney has been permitted to testify in 
an inquiry to ascertain as between devisees under 
the client's will and a grantee claiming under a deed 
from the client made after the will, as to what was 
intended by the deed." 
So far as consideration is concerned, Margaret signed 
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the deed freely and voluntarily so as to be relieved from 
her responsibility of caring for Wilmer, and for a consid-
eration of $500.00. That disposes of her statutory one-
third interest which she is claiming as Wilmer's widow. 
As to the remaining two-thirds interest which she is claim-
ing as administratrix of Wilmer's estate, Wilmer had a 
right to dispose of that by will to someone other than Mar-
garet or to deed it to anyone without her consent. He did 
dispose of such interest for a consideration that in his 
judgment was equitable and fair, and for a consideration 
which we will show later is legal and recognized as con-
sonant with public policy. The administratrix is in no 
better position than Wilmer Webb, and what would not be 
hearsay as to Wilmer would not be hearsay as to her. If 
Wilmer were alive, testimony by the plaintiffs that they 
agreed to his proposition and so advised his attorney and 
representative would be admissible. Would Wilmer be 
permitted to say, after executing and delivering the deed 
under the arrangements present in this case, and after the 
plaintiffs paid out for his benefit some two thousand dol-
lars, and assuming plaintiffs were willing, ready and able 
to continue with their end of the bargain, that plaintiffs 
could not testify to the arrangement because the arrange-
ment was made with Wilmer's attorney and representa-
tive? Such evidence would not be hearsay as to Wilmer 
and would be admissible against him. And by the same 
token it is admissible against his administratrix. 
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Any testimony by :Mr. Crafts or anyone else as to 
statements made by \Vilmer in his lifetime concerning 
the disposition of his property and the fact that he con-
veyed it to someone else, is admissible, even as against the 
hearsay rule, after his death. The rule is stated in Jones 
on Eridence (2nd Ed) Vol 3, Sec. 1164; and is set forth 
in the case of Stoddard vs. Newhall, 81 Pac. 666, at page 
667, as follows : 
Now it has been held over and over again in the 
analogous case of declarations against pecuniary 
interest that the declarations of the deceased person 
may be received not only to prove so much contained 
in it as is adverse to his pecuniary interest, but to · 
prove collateral facts stated in it, at all events, so 
far as it relates to the facts which are not foreign 
to the declaration and may be taken to have formed 
a substantial part of it~ 
The declaration of a locator of a mining claim 
that he had conveyed the property by deed, and had 
been paid therefor, is an admission against his in-
terest, and admissible after his death._ Scott vs. 
Crouch, 24 Utah 377, 67 Pac. 1068. 
To the same effect is Smith vs. Hanson, 34 Utah 171, 
96 Pac. 1087. 
Miscellaneous 
The appellants take the position also that a convey-
ance made for support and maintenance, or a contract or 
a~reement to convey in consideration of future support 
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and maintenance, is against public policy and not based 
upon a valuable consideration; and that there is a pre-
sumption that such a contract is not fairly made. 
We find no case in Utah on this direct proposition 
but other jurisdictions have passed squarely on it and 
have held that a deed given under such circumstances is 
supported by a good and sufficient consideration. 
Where an old lady granted her realty, worth 
$40,000.00 or more, reserving a life estate to herself, 
to her intimate friend, who covenanted fully to sup-
port and maintain the grantor, the con,~eyance -was 
supported by consideration. Rogers vs. Scott, 1511 
Pac. 379 (Cal). 
Conveyance by aged and invalid man in return 
for care and support for remainder of his life, made 
at time when it was possible hat he might live for 
years, and when grantee was required to give up 
employment to care for grantor, held supported by 
sufficient consideration, tho graJ.ltor died within 
short time. Johnson vs. Studley, et ux., 252 Pac. 
638 (Cal). 
And in the Johnson vs. Studley case, supra, the Cali-
fornia Court made this observation, (252 Pac. 638 at pag·e 
647): 
The matter of the 90nsideration for a grant or 
the assignment of property is, in conceivable cases, 
of controlling importance, particularl~r where the 
considerat~on appears to be grossly inadequate. 
r.rhis declaration has pcenliar application to suits in 
equity for the enforcement of executory agreements 
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for the sale of real property. But in such cases, as 
in actions like the one before us, "the sufficiency 
of the purported or claimed consideration for a con-
tract of the character under discussion must be de-
termined from the facts of the transaction as they 
existed when the contract was made, rather than by 
subsequent developments.'' 
''The sufficiency of a purported consideration 
for a contract must be determined from the facts of 
the transaction as they existed w·hen the contract 
was made rather than by subsequent developments.'' 
Long Beach Drug Co. rs. United Drug Co., 88 Pac. 
(2nd) 698, at page 701. 
The instant case is not one involving the rights of a 
husband and wife, as between themselves, or one where 
a husband has made a property settlement with the wife 
or has procured some post-marital agreement or made -a 
settlement with the wife in anticipation of a divorce, and 
cases dealing with the above subjects are not applicable. 
The evidence in the case at bar is to the effect that :1\Iar-
garet refused to stay with \Vilmer and take care of him, 
but was perfectly willing to execute the deed and accept 
$500.00 and let \Vilmer's brothers and their wives assume 
the personal responsibility of caring for an invalid, besides 
assuming the responsibility of paying all expenses in the 
years to come. Had \Vilmer lived for several years and 
a goodly part or all of the assets which he turned to his 
brothers been used up in payment of hospital bills, doc-
tor bills, medicines and other expenses, :Margaret would 
have felt she 1nade a good bargain, and it was a good rid-
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dance. The court found that Margaret knew she was exe-. 
cuting a deea for the home as well as other realty and 
that she did not intend to live in or use the home after 
1\:fay of 1946, that she was informed as to the kind of 
property owned by her husband and had some idea of 
its value. There is no evidence whatsoever, outside Mar-
garet's own bald statement, that any advantage was taken 
of her. As a matter of fact Mr. Crafts went out of his way 
to explain to her the nature of the transaction and to 
advise her to consult someone respecting the execution 
of the deed. Even though she stated she did not want 
anything out of Wilmer's estate, Crafts practically in-
sisted that she take $500.00. The cases and authorities 
cited by appellants concerning future support, right to 
maintenance or alimony, etc., have no application in the 
instant case. 
Proof Does Not Show Right to Further Accounting 
Respondents agree with the appellants that the plead-
ings . establish the fact that prior to March, 1946, there 
was a partnership between Wilmer Webb and the plain-
tiffs and that by mutual consent the partnership was 
dissolved. But we cannot agree with appellants that they 
are entitled to any accounting for the property described 
in the deed and bill of sale, or for any bonds or other prop-
erty turned over to the plaintiffs by Wilmer. As a matter 
of fact the record diseloses that the defendants were per-
mitted by the court to go into the matter of an accounting 
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exhaustively, and many exhibits and much proof was 
introduced by the defendants attempting to establish 
that the plaintiffs came into possession of a considerable 
amount of partnership property not included in the bill 
of sale. 
When the defendants rested their main case, and 
after going fully into the so-called partnership matters, 
they "reserved the question on account," (Tr. 272). Then, 
later, when the defendants concluded their surrebuttal, 
the following proceedings appear (Tr. 350 which is page 
263 of the reporter's transcript) : 
THE CouRT: Do you rest f 
~IR. JENSE~: There are these questions, your Honor, 
that deal with the part~e~ship, and these cattle and these 
papers we have asked that they have produced to aid- the 
court in determining the necessity of an accounting. 
(Discussion). 
THE CouRT: Is it agreeable to both sides that the 
case be disposed of as to the issues, except as to the issues 
as to whether there should be an accounting had by the 
plaintiff to the defendant as administratrix~ 
MR. CLINE: It is agreeable with us, your Honor. 
THE CouRT: Is it agreeable to the defendants that 
the issues exclusive of the demand for an accounting be 
disposed of at this time, and that the case be left open for 
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the court to decide whether there should be an accounting, 
and if so, when to take further evidence~ 
MR. JENSEN : I think that would be true as to the 
specially described property. 
(Discussion). 
THE CouRT : Are you willing to submit the case ex-
clusive of the issue as to whether an accounting should be 
required? 
MR.. J ENSEN-s Yes. 
THE CouRT: And then either argue it on that issue 
later or reopen for further evidence on either side if you 
see fit to put in eviden,ce. 
MR. J ENSENS Yes. 
THE CouRT: You may proceed to argue the case. 
We have no quarrel with the law quoted by appellants 
in their brief at pages 102 and 103 thereof concerning an 
accounting as between a partner and the legal representa-
tive of a deceased partner. In this case the partners 
themselves, during their lifetime, ~issolved the partner-
ship, and when Wilmer passed away there was no partner-
ship. 
Appellants state that the deed and bill of sale do not 
purport to transfer Wilmer's right to payment for the 
property therein described, nor to his cash, water stock, 
bonds, accounts receivable, etc. Of course the deed and 
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bill of sale do not on their face purport to transfer Wil-
mer's right to payment for the property. But the record 
itself shows the consideration for the conveyances. The 
record shows that \Vilmer, with Margaret's full knowl-
edge and consent, was turning all of his property to the 
plaintiffs in consideration of maintenance and support 
and the payment of his outstanding hospital, doctor and 
other indebtedness. The record shows that Wilmer trans-
ferred title to his car to the plaintiffs about the same time 
as he signed the bill of sale, and that he turned his bonds 
to them and they took possession of the bonds under the 
same arrangement. 
The bill of sale covers all of Wilmer's right, title 
and interest in all machinery and equipment of every 
kind, nature and description owned by Webb Brothers. 
It also covers all other livestock owned by him or in which 
he had an equity. The court found that such disposition 
disposed of any right to an accounting insofar as livestock, 
including cattle and pigs, and machinery was concerned. 
Defendants were clearly not entitled to any accounting 
for bonds or property that Wilmer conveyed to the plain-
tiffs in accordance with the agreement for support and 
maintenance, etc. vVhile the defendants contended that 
the water stock was personal property, yet the deed con· 
veyed not only the realty but all appurtenant water rights, 
however evidenced. 
The defendants were permitted to go fully into the 
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matter of the partnership assets. They called witnesses 
of their own. They examined the plaintiffs. They intro-
duced numerous exhibits. Nothing was uncovered by the 
defendants showing that the plaintiffs had done away with 
or appropriated to their own use property which properly 
belonged to the estate of Wilmer vV ebb. Defendants, in 
their brief, have not indicated or suggested wherein they 
are entitled to an accounting. They have not pointed 
out wherein they were prevented by the court from pre-
senting any further or additional proof to show their 
right to an accounting. It is not sufficient to merely 
allege in a pleading that the litigant is entitled to an 
accounting in order to require the court to order an ac-
counting. The person asserting such right is required to 
produce competent and sufficient evidence showing a 
right to an accounting, and to produce competent and suf-
ficient evidence thereafter that there are assets and prop-
erties to which he is entitled. 
Plaintiffs and defendants agreed, at the conclusion 
of the trial, that the issues, exclusive of the demand for 
an accounting, be disposed of immediately, and that the 
case be left open for the court to decide whether there 
should be an accounting and if so, when to take further 
evidence, (Tr. 351). While the record is silent as to any 
further proceedings in court, yet finding No. 19 (Tr. 56), 
recites as follows : 
"That it was stipulated in open court by coun-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
43 
sel for the plaintiffs and counsel for the defendants 
that the defendant :Margaret l.N ebb, as administra-
trix of the Estate of \Vilmer Webb, deceased, was 
entitled to. and should have delivered to her one 
thirty-two caliber Special Winchester Rifle and 
case, one pair of field glasses and one wrist watch 
in the event the wrist watch js located by either of 
the plaintiffs, and that there should be paid to her 
flS such administratrix the sum of $90.00, being one-
third of the value of one hundred bushels of grain, 
an additional sum of $90.00 being the equity of Wil-
mer Webb in $270.00 of partnership assets paid to 
plaintiffs for feed pellets, and the additional sum of 
$141.00 being the equity of vVilmer Webb in $423.00 
of partnership assets paid to plaintiffs for alfalfa 
seed, and the court finds, pursuant to the said stip-
ulation that the foregoing property and foregoing 
sums of money are assets of the estate of Wilmer 
Webb and in the possession of said plaintiffs.'' 
This indicates that the parties stipulated to whatever 
assets might be due the administratrix of Wilmer's es-
tate. In the light of this stipulation it seems to the re-
spondents that the burden of showing any right to addi-
tional or further moneys or assets. is on the defendants, 
and this Court cannot assume that the stipulation does 
not cover and was not intended to cover a complete set-
tlement between the parties ; or at least this Court can-
not assume that the defendants, since the conclusion of 
the trial, have discovered any further proof to submit 
to the court. 
:Moreover, the court did not shut the door on the mat-
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ter of an accounting and did not preclude the defendants 
from again litigating that issue, as is shown by Conclusion 
of Law No. 7, (Tr. 58) as follows: 
"That the defendant is not entitled to any ac-
counting upon the evidence as produced in the trial 
of said cause, but the right to an accounting should 
be at this time and in this cause rejected and denied 
without prejudice to the right of defendant to apply 
for an accounting hereafter, if she be so advised." 
A similar provision appears in the decree in para-
graph 6 thereof, (Tr. 60). 
The record shows the trial was concluded on Septem-
ber 6th, 194 7. The findings and conclusions and decree 
were signed on February 2nd, 1948, some four months 
later. The files show a notice directed to the defendants 
on December lOth, 1947, that on Decembr 15th, 1947, the 
plaintiffs would call up for determination the matter of 
the proposed findings, conclusions and decree submitted 
by the plaintiffs, (Tr. 48). The files also show that on 
December lOth, 1947, the court made an order that Decem-
ber 29th, 1947, was the time fixed for hearnig plaintiffs' 
proposed findings and conclusions and that the defendants 
have until December 22nd within which to prepare, serve 
and file objections thereto (Tr. 50). No objections 'vere 
filed or proposed by defendants to the finding or con-
clusion or to the provision in the decree that the right to 
an accounting should be "at this time and in this cause 
rejected and denied without prejudice to the right of de-
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fendant to apply for an accounting hereafter, if she be 
so advised. '' 
The record fails to show that at any time between 
September 6th, when the tdal was concluded and for some 
four months later when the proposed findings, conclusions 
and decree were actually sig·ned, did the defendants re-
quest leave to present further proof on the issue of an 
accounting. On the contrary the findings show that the 
parties stipulated to certain items of property and moneys 
which should be turned to the administratrix. In the ab-
sence of a sho·wing by the defendants that they asked leave 
to introduce further proof, defendants should not no'v be 
heard to complain concerning the court's action in reject-
ing an accounting as an issue, but without prejudice to 
their right to pursue the matter further if they be so ad-, 
vised. It is true, that as a general rule, a court must dis-
pose of all of the issues presented by the pleadings and 
proof. This the court did on the record made by the de-
fendants. Defendants failed to proffer further proof or 
even request more time within which to do so, and the 
trial court probably went farther in protecting the rights 
of the defendants than it was required to do, when the 
accounting matter and issue was disposed of without 
prejudice to the right of defendants to apply for an ac-
counting hereafter. 
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We submit, therefore, that the decree of the trial 
court should be affirmed in its entirety. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINE, wILSON & CLINE, 
Attorneys for Respondents. 
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